

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative Security Assessment

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Foreward

1. Over three years ago, we concluded that an exclusive preoccupation with the Intifada and its consequences was insufficient, if the ultimate goal for Israelis and Palestinians remained a fair-minded, comprehensive peace. Despite the disappointment and bitterness that many experienced during that troubled time, we felt that a fresh examination of core issues was warranted and, indeed, necessary. Since then, political developments on the ground have further convinced us that neither community's needs could be met by today's political *status quo*.
2. We determined that our varied experiences with the Israeli/Palestinian conundrum might allow us to engage in a positive dialogue with academics, policy experts, officials, and civic leaders and that, by enlisting partners with functional expertise, creative ideas could be developed. We hoped that the experience, knowledge and understanding of our partners would guide us well. We have not been disappointed
3. Our goal in the Jerusalem Old City Initiative has been to develop creative options for the governance and management of the Old City which we hope will spark the imagination of negotiators and political leaders, once final status issues are again on the table. Consequently we have developed a modular needs-based approach integrated into special governance arrangements, treating the Old City as a single unit under a single administrator, having executive authority.
4. We do not believe an Old City, geographically divided between Israel and Palestine, to be sustainable; indeed we are concerned that it would threaten the viability of any comprehensive peace, given the mosaic of Holy Sites within it, their intense symbolism and the potential for confrontation over them. Our view has been that the wounds of war do not permit a divided Old City, particularly when sacred space therein is indivisible.
5. In December 2005, with the publication of "New Directions for Deliberation and Dialogue," the Initiative held a project launch in Istanbul attended by an array of Palestinian and Israeli experts and thinkers. There was naturally a wide variety of opinion respecting our ideas, but there was universal accord that options for the Old City had to be explored in detail hitherto absent, if there was to be any hope of a negotiated settlement.
6. The problem of exactly where to start had been a dilemma for us: governance, Holy Sites, property ownership, economic and social needs, a legal framework, the list seemed endless. But in Istanbul, there was unanimity that security was paramount.
7. We therefore looked for a top flight team of experts who could take the lead, with our Israeli, Palestinian and other partners, in pooling their collective wisdom and authoring a study with integrity and merit. We found them in John de Chastelain, former Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff and currently Chief Arms De-commissioner for Northern Ireland; Roy Berlinquette, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and Ambassador Art Hughes, a former Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.
8. We could not have been more fortunate. Working effectively as volunteers, they spent hours, weeks and months, meeting, talking, debating, researching and exploring this most complex of

issues. Their dedication and good humour made working with them immensely satisfying. The result is exactly what we hoped it would be: incisive, comprehensive, and deeply informed.

9. Herein is a package of suggested security arrangements for the Old City of Jerusalem which, we are convinced, can become a critical tool for political leaderships in seeking the peace agreement we all hope for.

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Executive Summary

1. The Old City of Jerusalem is the central focus of the national aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians. The Old City of Jerusalem is perhaps the most contentious issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its sovereignty, administration and control are questions of great dispute, and its holy sites resonate powerfully in the hearts and minds of Muslims, Jews and Christians. If questions respecting the Old City remain unresolved, stability in Jerusalem cannot be assured and peace between Israelis and Palestinians will be impossible.

2. The Jerusalem Old City Initiative aims to develop creative options for the effective governance and management of the Old City, including security arrangements addressed in this paper. This goal is predicated on ensuring the integrity of the Old City and its holy space; the area is too small, densely populated and architecturally linked to be managed viably by a mix of different authorities and police forces.

3. Special governance arrangements are therefore proposed (dealt with in detail in a separate governance paper), treating the Old City as a single unit under an Administrator with executive authority, accountable to a Governance Board composed of the parties themselves and international stakeholders acceptable to both. These arrangements would be within the framework of an agreement between the parties, with two national capitals, Al Quds and Yerushalayim. It should be stressed that this initiative is not designed to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties respecting sovereignty over the Old City and in no way prejudices them. Rather, the initiative outlines practical mechanisms which can be implemented under various sovereignty options.

4. These proposed security arrangements are designed to address the fundamental security and law enforcement needs of the Old City and its residents, while ensuring freedom of worship, dignity, access, and equity of treatment for all stakeholders. They require close coordination with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. Indeed, their success will depend on the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to agree on the implementation of such special governance arrangements and to develop conditions that permit coexistence in this most contested and sacred of cities.

5. Within such a framework, and after careful consideration of the recommendations of Israeli and Palestinian security experts, the following security recommendations have been developed:


- a. The Administrator should be accountable to an international governance board composed of international stakeholders and the Parties themselves;
- b. A single Old City Police Service should be established, reporting to the Administrator, who should have ultimate responsibility for security arrangements in the Old City;
- c. The Administrator should be responsible for naming a Chief of Police, in consultation with the international governance board, to serve for a fixed period of service;
- d. The police service should function under a unified command structure headed by a Chief of Police to whom all on the force will be accountable;
- e. The police service should be professional, effective, impartial, accountable and integrated, and composed of international officers from countries acceptable to the Parties and with clear hiring criteria consistent with international standards. The issue of whether Palestinians and Israelis should be taken into the police service should be examined by the Administrator and the Chief of Police in the context of the satisfactory implementation of the agreement and the establishment of trust between the Parties. Their deployment should be determined by the Chief of Police;
- f. Police responsibilities should include community policing, enforcement of civil and criminal laws, implementation of security arrangements affecting movement and access to

and through the Old City, security and intelligence functions, counter-terrorism, and protecting the rights of all the City's residents and visitors. The police service should be organized and staffed to be able to deal with all contingencies;

- g. The police should have the authority to investigate, question, arrest and detain suspects in conformity with accepted international norms, and to remand them to the custody of Israeli or Palestinian authorities, or, in appropriate cases to be defined, to an Old City judicial system.;
- h. The police service should, by necessity, coordinate its efforts closely with Israeli and Palestinian security authorities, including in matters of "pursuit" and access control to the Old City;
- i. A special emphasis should be placed on learning, training and development, as keys to achieving professionalism and performance success in the police service, given the unusually complex and sensitive environment; and
- j. Arrangements touching on the sanctity of holy sites and access to them should be dealt with to the satisfaction of the religious communities, subject to the requirements of public order. Special security arrangements should be developed for these sites in close coordination with advisory religious and heritage bodies.

6. From our reading of the papers produced by Israeli and Palestinian partners, and our consultations with them, we are aware that there is not full agreement respecting these proposals. It is our strong belief however that the points of difference are resolvable and an effective, fair-minded and sustainable security system for the Old City is achievable.

7. It is possible that a situation of major unrest could occur that includes the complete breakdown of the Palestinian Authority in the region prior to any agreement being reached to set up the special regime for the Old City that we are proposing in this paper. We believe that such a circumstance would make it extremely unlikely that the special regime could be activated, and it is not considered further here.



Christian Quarter

Muslim Quarter

Old City

Dome of the Rock

Armenian Quarter

Jewish Quarter

--- 1967 line

Glossary

CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CLO	Community Liaison Officers
CROPS	Criminal Operations Unit
DCOP-Adm	Deputy Chief of Police - Administration
DCOP-Ops	Deputy Chief of Police - Operations
EECU	Entry and Exit Control Unit
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERF	Emergency Reserve Force
EU COPPS	European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
HSPU	Holy Site Police Unit
ILCTU	Intelligence, Liaison and Counter Terrorism Unit
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JOCI	Jerusalem Old City Initiative
LTD	Learning, Training and Development
NPU	Neighbourhood Policing Unit
PORDU	Public Order Rapid Deployment Unit
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Introduction

1. This assessment examines security, the core issue in the challenge of how Jerusalem might be addressed in the final status negotiations between Israel and Palestine (known as the Parties). Without an equitable, reliable and sustainable security arrangement for the Old City, we believe that no final status agreement is possible. This assessment is the result of our study, examination and discussion of what such a security arrangement might be. We were guided by a desire to be comprehensive -to offer detailed proposals where possible and to flag other issues that would need further consideration -and also by the conviction that any security system for the Old City could work only if it were part of a governance arrangement created and supported by the Parties themselves. This paper does not address the issue of sovereignty. However, we believe that this assessment constitutes a useful resource for policy planners, negotiators and decision makers as they deal with the single most difficult and contentious issue among the myriad questions relating to Jerusalem.

2. The Old City of Jerusalem and its holy sites resonate powerfully in the hearts and minds of Muslims, Jews and Christians around the world. The Jerusalem Old City Initiative's approach to the Jerusalem conundrum is to recognize the full range of factors that affect resolution, including security, the symbolic importance of the Old City, the strong religious feelings of Jews, Muslims and Christians around the world, economic sustainability, the needs of the Old City's residents, and the interests of the Palestinians and Israelis more broadly. Fundamentally, we believe that a special governance system -what we call the Old City Special Regime (henceforth called the Regime) involving an international role fully agreed by Israel and Palestine -is required to achieve equity and long-term sustainability in this most sensitive of locales. Indeed, an agreed international presence in the Old City may also serve as a disincentive for the Parties to turn national mechanisms into instruments for territorial gain or struggles for power.

3. Any security mechanism within such a system must take full account of Jerusalem as the focal point of individual and group identities, and the sensitivities and mistrust this engenders. Taken together, these physical and symbolic factors make the Old City a soft target for those seeking to disrupt Muslim-Jewish and Israeli-Palestinian co-existence. Disruptions could range from provocative political action to outright terrorism, which would not only cause death and suffering, but also threaten their bilateral political agreements and indeed the general peace.

4. The Israelis and Palestinians taking part in this process of engagement on the Old City, while they may differ on specific issues, share the view that, without guarantees of a fair-minded security mechanism, no agreement respecting the Old City will be sustainable.

The Process

5. The Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI) has been engaged in consultations and studies on this question for over three years. Today, the initiative is pursuing a series of papers and studies focusing on governance (including the management of holy sites), security measures, symbolic issues and the political economy of the Old City. This paper looks specifically at the security dimension assessing options for negotiations between the Parties.

6. The importance to all stakeholders of security, in perception and actuality, and the potential urgent needs of decision-makers, have led the JOCI to pursue security first. The ideas presented will, however, ultimately be contingent on administrative and governance arrangements, especially regarding the holy sites. These will be presented in detail in subsequent documents to be published in the near future.

Aim

7. The aim of this paper is to assess the factors that members of the Security Working Group believe should form the basis of a security system for Jerusalem's Old City, under the authority of an Old City Special Regime.

Outline

8. This assessment will be structured under the following headings:

Background;
Premise and Source of Authority;
Mandate;
Duration;
Organization;
Command and Control;
Operations;
Learning, Training and Development;
Infrastructure;
Administration and Logistics;
Oversight; and
Conclusion

Background

9. This document's authors have extensive professional experience in the areas of policing, diplomacy, the operation of international policing organizations and military and peacekeeping operations. None of us is an expert on Jerusalem's security requirements, but we have each spent considerable time familiarizing ourselves with the situation in the Old City. It is not for us to decide what security system should be adopted by the Old City Special Regime. Nevertheless, we have examined the special nature of the security requirements in Jerusalem's Old City, and we have been informed by detailed papers prepared on the subject by Israeli and Palestinian experts and by comprehensive consultations with individuals on both sides (For details, see References.) Based on their opinions, as well as on our experience, we have identified what we believe are some important factors to consider in establishing a security system under the Regime.

10. We accept that the security situation in the Old City of Jerusalem presents special challenges. But while some of them are unique to the Old City – particularly with regard to the holy sites – some of them are also found in conflict situations elsewhere. We have paid close attention to the setting up of new police services in post-conflict circumstances in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and East Timor, and we have attempted to apply lessons learned from these situations, where they apply, to the concept of a new security system for Jerusalem's Old City.

11. We start from the belief that no security system can provide one-hundred percent assurance of inviolability. The system existing in the Old City today is as effective as any, yet security incidents still occur. But we believe that once the Parties have agreed to establish a special Regime in the Old City, with an internationally-mandated responsibility to provide security for residents, worshippers and visitors, a security system – one that merits the confidence of the people and that has a good chance of success – can be put in place. The chances of success will be enhanced if:

- a. The Regime is created and sponsored by the two Parties and supported by the members of the Security Council, as well as other major nations;
- b. Israeli and Palestinian, as well as international, involvement in the security system will demonstrate the will to make it work;

- c. The existence of two national capitals in West and East Jerusalem, with all their accruing international recognition and financial advantages, serves to boost the Old City's prestige and economic prospects; and
- d. The knowledge that failure of the Regime will likely cause a breakdown in the Israel-Palestine Treaty -and also spell a return to violence and a loss of hope for the future – elicits support from those initially sceptical of the process.

12. In making this assessment we have put special emphasis on the Learning, Training and Development (LTD) component of the security system and we include a special annex on this subject (Annex C). In the annex, we discuss how the LTD component is not an end in itself, but represents a key long-term investment to achieve policing professionalism and performance success.

13. The context of the creation of this LTD process presumes a fundamental change in the socio-political relationship between Israel and Palestine, which is also the basic concept on which the establishment of the Old City Special Regime is predicated. The intention of the two Parties must be to make the Regime (and hence the Old City Police Service) work. It will involve the beginning of interdependency between the communities in the Old City and the police officers who serve them. It is a determination to create community-led, partnership-policing based on a firm commitment to the investigation, detection and prevention of crime, the enforcement of the rule of law, the maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of life and property. Implicit in this commitment is the need to protect and respect human rights. The goals, core values, and principles of such an approach permeate the suggestions in this study.

Premise and Source of Authority

14. The Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI) has developed a set of working assumptions, premised on a framework that envisages two independent states, Israel and Palestine, with the city of Jerusalem divided along an agreed line into Al Quds and Yerushalyam, with the Old City the subject of a special governance system. This Old City Special Regime, or the Regime, will be based on a formal agreement between Palestine and Israel and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in a manner to be agreed by the Parties. The Regime will be administered by an Administrator who is neither Israeli nor Palestinian, appointed for a fixed renewable period by a Governance Board (with functions to be further defined) composed of members agreed to by Israel and Palestine, to which the Administrator will be accountable.

15. The Parties will prepare the mandate and issue it to the Administrator. The mandate will delegate to the Administrator authority over many Old City matters, including a security system.

16. The security system should be constituted in the form of an Old City Police Service, (henceforth called the Police Service), headed by a Chief of Police appointed for a fixed period by the Administrator, with the agreement of a Governance Board composed of representatives of the parties themselves – Israel and Palestine – and international stakeholders acceptable to both. It will be critical for the Police Service to have a close ongoing cooperative relationship with police as well as intelligence and other relevant agencies of Israel and Palestine. This can best be done by having attached Israeli and Palestinian liaison officers seconded to Police Service Headquarters in the Old City. In addition we believe that the Administrator and Chief of Police should establish formal cooperative relationships with the security agencies of other countries and with Interpol.

Mandate

17. The mandate for the security system, issued by the Parties to the Administrator, should be to preserve law and order in the Old City and to ensure the equal and fair treatment of all who live or visit there. This mandate should be confined to the area of the Old City – a universally accessible city, indivisible within the walls – whose gates lead directly into Israel or Palestine. But allowance should be made for the security system’s members to operate in those areas outside but close to the walls, where the implementation of effective entry and exit security measures make such exceptions necessary. Consideration should also be given to allow periodic inspections of the exterior of the walls by Police Service members.

18. Given the existence in the Old City of holy sites of great importance to the three Abrahamic religions, special concerns relate to security within the walls. The security system should be based on a Police Service charged *inter alia* with carrying out conventional day-to-day policing functions and enforcing the law. It should also provide the measures necessary to ensure access to, and the security of, the holy sites as well as response to potential mass demonstrations and violence related to those sites. To ensure the protection of, and access to, the holy sites, the methods in effect now should be continued until new procedures, made in consultation with the religious authorities, can be effected. At the point during the handover period when the Old City Police Service has a preponderance of personnel in position and taking charge of security roles, we envisage the Police Service taking control of the security of the holy sites from the Israelis, working in conjunction with whatever traditional security elements are agreed to have a continuing role in them.

Duration

19. As long as the Regime continues to exist, its security system will have to exist also. Given the proposal that the mandate continue for an indefinite period pending agreement by the Parties on an alternative arrangement, consideration of tour length will become an important factor.

20. It is clearly advantageous to have security system members remain in place for as long as possible, as effectiveness in their role will improve with experience. On the other hand, countries may be unwilling to release their nationals for service in the Police Service for lengthy periods, and independent individuals seeking involvement may not wish to engage in lengthy contracts. In particular, training requirements for members will have to be tailored based on anticipated tour lengths and these will be discussed below under Learning, Training and Development. As a rule, however, we believe that to provide an effective security system in the Old City, tour lengths for its members should be open-ended, but members must commit to serve for a minimum of three years after training has been completed.

Organization

21. **General** The security system will be headed by the Chief of Police who will report to and receive direction from the Administrator, who will be responsible to the Governance Board.

22. **Old City Police Service** The basis of the Old City security system should be an Old City Police Service. This service should be designed to carry out a number of functions necessary for the safety and security of the Old City, including routine policing, protection of the holy sites, entry and exit control, and public order rapid response. The Police Service should be responsible for enforcing laws, ordinances and directives of the Administrator. While neighbourhood policing will be one of its major functions, the Police Service should also have:

a. A Criminal Operations Unit (CROPS) to address serious crimes such as murder, organized crime, drug operations, smuggling and kidnapping;

b. A viable intelligence organization, well connected to the intelligence organizations of the two Parties -by means of seconded officers from those organizations -that is capable of alerting the Administrator to potential threats or difficulties in a timely fashion;

c. Close connections with other national intelligence agencies and with Interpol; and

d. An internal training division as well as a logistical and administrative organization, capable of addressing the needs of the Service's members and their dependents.

23. **Structure** In Annex A we include an organizational chart depicting our assessment of how the Police Service could be structured to meet or exceed international standards of policing. While it will be the Chief of Police and his advisers who recommend the final organization of the Police Service to the Administrator – including its suggested size and structure – we believe that the outline offered in Annex A can provide the basis for initial planning.

24. We suggest that the Chief of Police should have two deputies, a Deputy Chief of Police Operations (DCOP-Ops) and a Deputy Chief of Police Administration (DCOP-Adm). The Chief of Police should have his own legal section reporting directly to him, as well as a public relations unit emphasizing outreach. All functions required to make the Police Service workable should be grouped under the two DCOPs.

25. The structure we propose is intended to take account of fundamental policing needs as well as potential security threats in the Old City. There are several aspects to this goal:

a. **Public Order** The objective is to have police contribute to a sense of normality, taking account of the special nature of the Old City with its holy sites, and the need, at times, to monitor entry and exit into and out of the two neighbouring states. It anticipates the possibility of having to react at short notice to unexpected events, and includes a full-time Public Order Rapid Deployment Unit (PORDU) within the Police Service for this purpose;

b. **Extreme Emergency**

1) Given the potential volatility of crowds during religious occasions, the large numbers that can be involved in such events, and the history of violent reaction to incidents on or around the holy sites, we believe there will be an on-call requirement to increase the strength of the security forces within the Old City, at relatively short notice, by a factor of three or four;

2) The role of such an Emergency Reserve Force (ERF) will be to provide the necessary trained manpower to flood the Old City with security forces and maintain this heightened presence for a period of up to several days. While in the short term, numbers can be provided by deploying the complete strength of the Police Service simultaneously, such a measure cannot be maintained for long. Hence the need for large numbers of additional reserves;

3) Clearly, such a large formation in place full-time would be prohibitively expensive as well as difficult to maintain when not required. But we think it is important that such an element – intended for operations only within the Old City – should be available to be drawn from outside sources rather than from existing units and resources belonging to the Parties. This formation will not be part of the Police Service and will be called on only when an emergency makes its presence necessary, at which point it will deploy to Jerusalem (into staging areas agreed by the Parties) and come under command of the Chief of Police for operations in the Old City only; and

4) We believe that the Administrator and the Chief of Police should consider how best to provide for this requirement. One option might be to make arrangements with one or

two countries acceptable to the Parties, and that are deployable within two to three hours (such as Italy and Turkey), to earmark trained and professional units for emergency intervention. Another option might be to call on formed maneuver units already deployed in the Mediterranean, such as NATO.

- c. The need to anticipate events that may require the deployment of the PORDU or the ERF -makes it essential that the intelligence apparatus within the Police Service be structured and maintained at a consistently high level and that it have access to existing outside intelligence sources;
- d. Since such problems described above could originate outside the Old City but within the territories of the two Parties, it is essential that the Parties be committed to energetic and constructive action to preclude such developments; and
- e. It is possible that a situation of major unrest could occur that includes the complete breakdown of the Palestinian Authority in the region prior to any agreement being reached to set up the special regime for the Old City that we are proposing in this paper. We believe that such a circumstance would make it extremely unlikely that the special regime could be activated, and it is not considered further here.

26. *Organizational Steps* We envisage several steps in the deployment and development of the Police Service. At the outset we foresee the employment of professional police officers from countries agreed to by the Parties. These officers will undertake an initial familiarization course and then assume responsibility from the Israeli security forces. In the second step, international candidates will be recruited and trained to the basic level of qualified police officers. Third, these newly qualified officers will be introduced into the Police Service while the international officers brought in at the beginning – with the exception of some in leadership roles – will be successively relieved of their duties. The culmination of this process will be a police service almost entirely composed of international members specifically recruited and trained for the Old City Police Service.

27. *Police Service Composition*

a. Concept

- 1) Our initial conception of the Old City Police Service was that, once fully established, it would incorporate not just international candidates but Israelis and Palestinians recruited specifically for the Service. We believed that doing so would give both Parties a feeling of greater involvement in the policing of the Old City and would pave the way for whatever security system is put in place once the Regime's mandate expires. However, we were advised of the difficulties that would arise from employing Israelis and Palestinians as police officers in the Police Service at an early stage in the operation of the Regime, and we have adjusted our thinking accordingly. Nonetheless, we believe that at some future time, in the context of satisfactory implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the building of mutual trust, the Administrator should re-examine this option with the Parties; and
- 2) Our agreed conception therefore is that the Police Service should include international police officers only, but with trained and qualified unarmed Israeli and Palestinian Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) engaged as part of the Police Service. The CLOs will be assigned to the Police Service stations throughout the Old City and will work closely with the international police officers in the

neighbourhoods and with their various ethnic and religious groups. As we see it, the need to get the Police Service up and running as swiftly as possible – once the decision is made to adopt it – requires that it be initially made up of experienced international police officers. These will have to undergo a course that familiarizes them with the special circumstances of the Old City. Once deployed, they will be accompanied by CLOs, either Israeli or Palestinian, as circumstances warrant.

b. Recruits

While the trained international police element is providing security in the Old City, international police recruits will undertake basic police training to prepare them to take their place as qualified police officers in the Police Service. Candidates will be recruited from countries agreed to by the Parties and will need to reflect an appropriate mix of responsible international players. As this latter group completes its training and is deployed into active police service, the original international contingent may, with the exception of some leadership elements, be gradually drawn down, decreasing the burden placed on the initial contributing countries; and

c. Recommendation

Our recommendation that the Police Service be composed solely of international police officers is not an argument against attaching Israeli and Palestinian intelligence and counter-terrorism officers, seconded from their respective services, to the Police Service. Indeed, we feel that such an attachment is vital to the effective functioning of the Police Service. The subject is discussed below in connection with the establishment of a Joint Operations Centre.

Command and Control

28. All members of the Police Service will be under the command of the Chief of Police who will report to the Administrator. As mentioned earlier, we believe the Chief of Police should appear regularly before the Governance Board, either at the Board's or the Chief's initiative. We believe the ability of the Chief of Police to have regular access to the members of such an organization, and they to him, is essential to the efficient conduct of the police services and security role in the Old City.

29. Other factors relating to command and control within the Police Service include:

- a. ***Seconded Israelis and Palestinian Police Officers*** The Liaison, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Unit should be grouped under the DCOP-Ops and it is here that we envisage the secondment of experienced members of the Israeli and Palestinian police organizations needed for these roles. While these officers will work closely with the Police Service during their secondment, they should remain under the command of their parent organizations;
- b. ***Access to Other Intelligence Agencies*** The Police Service will need assured access to the Israeli and Palestinian police and other relevant agencies, by means of a formal liaison system;
- c. ***Special Status*** Whether or not members of the Police Service should have some form of special status conferred by Israel and Palestine, as presumably other members of the Regime will have, is something that should be determined during the planning stage of the Regime;
- d. ***Ease of Movement*** A number of Police Service units (e.g. Logistics and Training) and their headquarters will be located outside the Old City. The PORDU and the ERF (when deployed) will also be located outside the walls. Some of these units may be stationed in Yerushalyam and some in Al Quds, as agreed between the Administrator and the Parties. Regardless of their location, it is essential that these

units be given unimpeded access in and out of the Old City in the performance of their duties.

30. ***Headquarters Location***

- a. We envisage Command of the Police Service being executed from an Old City Police Service Headquarters located within the Old City, with subordinate headquarters or stations located where necessary to control the different functions of neighbourhood policing, holy site security and entry and exit control;
- b. We see the DCOP-Ops exercising command from his headquarters located in the Old City, with most of his units' headquarters located there also. We see the DCOP-Adm. exercising command from his headquarters located outside the Old City, with all of his units located there in areas to be negotiated by the Administrator with the Parties;
- c. We see the PORDU being located outside the Old City but with easy access to it; and
- d. The ERF (Emergency Reserve Force), when deployed, will be placed temporarily in holding areas to be negotiated in advance with the Parties. To conduct operations it will be deployed into the Old City.

Operations

31. ***General***

As mentioned earlier, we envisage the Police Service being formed and readied for operation in several stages:

- a. First, the Chief of Police and his principal commanders will do the preliminary staff work to set up the organization including deciding on structures, determining the required numbers, acquiring the necessary equipment, infrastructure, communications and supplies, and setting up the necessary recruiting and training apparatus;
- b. Second, the experienced international police officers who will initially comprise the Police Service will commence familiarization training that prepares them to take over policing in the Old City from the Israeli security forces. Simultaneously, prospective international candidates will be recruited and start basic training courses, and the Israeli and Palestinian CLOs (Community Liaison Officers) will be recruited and trained;
- c. Third, the trained international police officers will take over the security of the Old City from the Israeli security elements, and CLOs will be deployed with them as necessary. As recruits complete their training and become qualified police officers, they will be introduced into the active Police Service. To minimize the time between the Regime's formation and the start of Police Service operations, it is likely that the numbers of trained international police personnel initially deployed will be high. As more recruits are trained and take their place, the initial numbers of trained international police personnel can be reduced; and
- d. The Chief of Police will undertake to form Local Neighbourhood Policing Partnerships. Their purpose will be to provide the Chief of Police and the neighbourhood police commanders with views on matters concerning the policing of local areas. Implicit in this concept is that it will build co-operation and increase trust between the police and area inhabitants, encouraging the latter to assist in maintaining law and order where it most concerns them.

32. ***Standard Operating Procedures*** The Chief of Police should be responsible for all operations conducted by the Police Service. To this end he will approve the operational structures needed to exercise his mandate. He should also be responsible for developing the necessary procedures to permit the Police Service to function. These procedures will have to take account of procedures already being followed in the Old City – e.g., holy site security (see also below) – so that

disruption of day-to-day life resulting from the change of security systems is minimized. The procedures will be particularly essential given the various international elements that make up the initial structure of the Police Service. Firmly enforced procedures will be necessary to ensure that officers from different national police services operate as a cohesive organization from the outset. Separate procedures will also have to be established for each of the Service's personnel, administrative and logistics units.

33. **Operational Handover** Of particular importance will be the way in which the handover of the security operation in the Old City is managed between the Police Service and the Israeli Security Forces. There will need to be an agreed period of time between the establishment of the Regime and the point at which the Police Service is ready to assume the complete security operation from the Israeli security elements. In that interim period the latter should continue to maintain control of security operations in the Old City and gradually hand over responsibility to the Police Service as its personnel and units become ready to assume it. The Chief of Police must be responsible for advising the Administrator of the length of time this interim period will take, and for making the appropriate phasing arrangements with the Israeli security authorities.

34. **Policing Division** The Policing Division should be responsible for routine policing in the Old City, for holy site security, for entry and exit security, for Rapid Deployment, for Intelligence, Liaison and Counter-Terrorism and for serious crime prevention.

a. Routine Policing

- 1) **The Neighbourhood Police Unit** (NPU) will be responsible for the enforcement of routine policing within the Old City. We envisage this function being sub-divided into responsibilities for different neighbourhoods within the Old City, with foot patrols being the preferred method of maintaining law and order and of contributing to a sense of security among inhabitants and visitors;
- 2) **Patrol Composition**
 - i. We believe such patrols should involve international Police Service officers, along with Israeli or Palestinian CLOs to demonstrate the special nature of the Police Service's mandate as well as the determination of the Administrator and the Parties to see that it works. The patrols' composition should follow principles of equity in the treatment of residents and visitors alike, and should be put together according to the demographic needs of the various Old City areas. When necessary, these patrols will allow for arrest of inhabitants or visitors in the most effective and efficient way possible; and
 - ii. No matter the nationality of the individual involved, officers of all nationalities should be available to act in the most effective way possible and as required by the circumstance. For example, if there is an incident in an Israeli home, we envisage that international officers and Israeli CLOs will engage directly with the residents involved. If there is an incident in a Palestinian home, we envisage that international officers and Palestinian CLOs will respond.
 - iii. *Serious Crime*. Routine policing must include the investigation of serious crime, which will be conducted by the Criminal Operations Unit.

b. Holy Site Policing

- 1) The matter of the holy sites will be the subject of a separate study. In general, however, the Holy Site Policing Unit (HSPU) will be responsible for policing sites within the Old City. We envisage that the present procedures for protecting the sites should continue pending review by the Administrator and the Governance Board. This function should

include assuring undisturbed access to the sites and preventing incidents or damage to them;

- 2) Crucial to such policing will be the need to maintain close relations with the religious authorities that currently have responsibility for the sites, and to involve them to the degree considered appropriate in executing the task;
- 3) While special attention will have to be paid to the most sensitive of these sites, including the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount and the Western Wall/Kotel, the HSPU should consult with religious authorities to catalogue and prepare plans for the protection of all sites considered at risk;
- 4) Particular consideration should be given to specially composed detachments of the Police Service for the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif/Western Wall/Kotel. The nature of these sites and global attachments to them are such that the symbolic value of the carefully chosen and trained police units to be deployed at them needs to be seriously assessed; and
- 5) One method of dealing with these most sensitive sites might be to have two concentric rings providing security there. The inner ring would be composed of unarmed Muslims at the Temple Mount/ Haram al Sharif and unarmed Jews at the Western Wall/Kotel. The outer ring, further back but readily available to intervene if necessary, would be composed of armed Police Service officers – presumably international officers accompanied by Palestinian CLOs at the one, and international officers accompanied by Israeli CLOs at the other.

c. Entry and Exit Policing.

1) ***Concept***

- i. We understand that there is inherent conflict between normal access to a city with free and unhindered entry and exit, and the imposition of security checks. Nonetheless, an unavoidable part of providing security in any confined location is the requirement to control entry and exit there when necessary;
- ii. After an evolutionary period to build confidence and experience and within an atmosphere of orderly implementation of the Israel-Palestine Treaty, we believe that security checks will become minimal; and
- iii. The two Parties will have a significant interest in ensuring that persons of ill intent do not enter the Old City from their respective territories, and one can posit that the two will act decisively to ensure that does not happen since serious disruption of the Regime would have highly negative consequences for treaty implementation.

2) ***Control Points***

- i. The Entry and Exit Police Unit (EPU) will be responsible for supervising and controlling entry into and exit from the Old City. This task requires control points at each of the seven open gates, with special attention at those gates allowing both vehicle and pedestrian traffic;
- ii. We envisage one control point at each gate, with members of the EPU and representatives of the appropriate Party being colocated. While the Parties have indicated that they do not envisage individuals passing from one state to another through the Old City, we expect that they will wish to have their own agents located at their respective gates in the event there is a dispute over exit from, or re-entry into, their countries; and
- iii. The EPU's aim must be multifaceted: to build confidence among the inhabitants and to ensure minimum interference with the flow of pedestrian and authorized vehicle traffic, while taking account of the security needs of the moment. To this end a system that will allow a range of control measures, from minimum or no checking, to strenuous personnel and vehicle monitoring, should be put in place. Suggestions as to how this might be accomplished – at the Jaffa Gate, for example – are included in Annex B. Similar

suggestions can be developed for other gates as considered necessary by the Parties and the Administrator.

- iv. *Residents.* We believe that the Administrator, in concert with the Parties, will be responsible for determining who is a resident of the Old City and for issuing identity cards to them. These cards will facilitate exit or entry by Old City residents; and

4) *Passage Time*

In normal circumstances we anticipate that a pedestrian will transit entry/exit points in a matter of seconds.

d. Public Order Rapid Deployment.

The PORDU will be responsible for rapid response to incidents or events beyond the ability of routine policing units to handle. It will maintain a level of readiness commensurate with this requirement and be deployable in anticipation of such events. The unit will be trained in special tactics including riot and crowd control and will have the arms and equipment necessary for its role. The Explosive Ordnance Demolition (EOD) capability of the Police Service will be located in the PORDU. While the PORDU should be located outside the walls to accommodate spatial limitations and facilitate deployment, it may have advance elements permanently stationed at sensitive locations such as holy sites and the main access gates;

e. Intelligence, Liaison and Counter-Terrorism

- 1) The Intelligence, Liaison and Counter-Terrorism Unit (ILCTU) will function as the Police Service's intelligence and liaison unit as well as the planning unit for counter-terrorism measures. It will also be responsible for carrying out risk assessment on a daily basis. While for the most part the unit will be composed of international Police Service officers, it is here that we envisage experienced Israeli and Palestinian police and counter terrorism experts being seconded;
- 2) The unit will establish regular communication with other international intelligence services and will provide the main liaison function between the Police Service and the Israeli and Palestinian police organizations. Its location will be determined by the Chief of Police and the DCOP-Ops and may include sites both within and, with the Parties' concurrence, outside the walls;
- 3) While it will be for the Chief of Police to decide how he will organize his resources to best meet his mandate, we believe he will want to consider setting up a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) which will be the focal point for controlling and planning all operations conducted by the Police Service, and the Emergency Reserve Force if deployed. The seconded Israeli and Palestinian officers, and the liaison chain to outside police and other security elements, will be optimally placed in a JOC; and
- 4) We recommend that the Chief of Police and other senior officers of the Police Service keep in frequent contact with their Israeli and Palestinian counterparts.

f. Arrest and Handling of Suspects

- 1) *Authority.* The Police Service will have full authority to investigate, question, arrest and detain suspects in accordance with law and accepted international norms. The arrest and handling of suspects will normally be carried out by Neighbourhood Policing Unit officers assisted by Community Liaison Officers. We believe that suspects should normally be turned over to the appropriate national authorities as soon as possible, or, in exceptional cases, to the Old City's judicial system. They can be held temporarily in the Old City at one of the police stations in the appropriate neighbourhood. Further work on the judicial system will be developed in the JOCI study on governance;

- 2) ***Israelis and Palestinians.*** While the exact judicial process remains under study, we believe that the judicial process for Israelis and Palestinians arrested in the Old City and brought to trial will normally take place in either Israel or Palestine, as appropriate. Another option that remains under study is to develop some judicial capacity for the Governance Board;
- 3) ***Others.*** Suspects arrested in the Old City who are neither Israeli nor Palestinian will be handled by the Police Service in accordance with accepted international standards. The question of which courts will be used to deal with cases involving such individuals will be determined by the Administrator in consultation with the Parties;
- 4) ***Pursuit.*** We expect that there will be occasions when suspects in the Old City may flee Police Service officers seeking their apprehension in accordance with law. Such individuals may attempt to leave the Old City. However, every Old City gate will have control posts staffed by Police Service and Israeli or Palestinian authorities. These can take the fugitive into custody pending arrival of the pursuing Police Service officers. If for some reason the fugitive is able to flee the Old City, consideration should be given to authorizing pursuit jointly by Police Service officers and the Israeli or Palestinian national police. Alternatively, those who flee could become the object of the Old City Special Regime's judicial arrest warrants and sought by the Palestinian or Israeli police as appropriate. Similar arrangements could be made for circumstances where fugitives from Israel or Palestine seek refuge in the Old City;
- 5) ***Old City Police Service Officers Giving Testimony.*** While members of the Police Service will have no jurisdiction outside the Old City, we believe that those officers who are involved in arrests should be able to appear in court outside the Old City in an official capacity to give evidence;

f. The Carriage of Arms.

We believe that Police Service officers on duty within the Old City should be armed in a manner to be determined by the Chief of Police and they should be the only individuals permitted to own or carry arms inside the Old City. The Old City free of weapons in private hands is critical to calm and stability. We believe that Israel should work with the Administrator and the Police Service to ensure the turnover of a "weapons free" city to the Regime.

Learning, Training and Development

35. ***General*** The Learning, Training and Development strategy we propose is based on a philosophy of learning that emphasizes core themes including human rights, situational training, continuous learning culture, and international experience. These themes are cornerstones to implementing a successful training strategy that will develop a new police service, one that is all-inclusive when dealing with different cultural backgrounds, and that promotes policing in cooperation with the community in its neighbourhood policing approach. For recruiting to be successful, service in the Old City Police Service must be seen to constitute a satisfactory and rewarding experience, with remuneration at internationally recognized rates and with work conditions that compare favourably with those in use elsewhere. This must be the case both for the trained international contingents brought in to start the process, and for those individuals recruited for long term service.

36. ***Transition Team*** As mentioned earlier we envisage a staged deployment of police units or squads in the Old City each of which will have its own training requirements. Details of the proposed Police Service training program are included in Annex C, but in general we anticipate a

two-month period of conversion training for the Transition Team of trained police officers who will constitute the initial deployment of the Police Service. This conversion training will include an introduction to the rule of law that will govern the Old City, instruction in the special circumstances of its religious and cultural differences, and some basic language training for those with no knowledge of Arabic or Hebrew. We do not anticipate lengthy language training for either these or the follow-on members of the Police Service. We feel that each should have some very basic instruction at the outset, and for those who will spend longer periods in the Police Service, additional courses can occasionally be given to improve capacity and fluency. At the same time as the Transition Team undergoes its conversion training, we envisage a course for the Israeli and Palestinian Community Liaison Officers. The CLOs would be recruited on an individual basis and trained in the basic function of the Police Service and their role in it, and they would be deployed with the Transition Team as appropriate from the outset.

37. ***Follow-on Members*** The follow-on, individually recruited international candidates should undergo a six-month introductory program that mirrors basic police training. The program should include some elemental language training for those who need it, to be followed by a six-month period of probationary Police Service deployment, with each new officer participating in an international police tutor program, i.e. under the watchful eye of a trained international police officer.

38. ***Steady State*** Such a training program envisages that once the decision to establish the Regime is made, there will be at least a two-month preparation period before the initial international police deployment begins and – at the earliest – a subsequent four-month period before the first of the recruits start being introduced into the system. As more newly qualified officers complete their probation, more and more of the initial international cohort can be replaced, although there will continue to be a need to retain some officers at the more senior supervisory levels. Once a steady state has been reached, there will be an ongoing requirement to run training courses for a variety of purposes including basic training for new recruits to address attrition, as well as advanced and specialty courses. In the latter case it is envisaged that officers who already have specialty qualifications, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), should be recruited directly at the outset to fill the required positions.

Infrastructure

39. The Police Service will require ‘bricks and mortar’ infrastructure to support its operational, training and administrative functions. Arrangements will have to be made to acquire this infrastructure immediately after the decision to form the Regime so that the initial deployment of Police Service staff and training personnel can commence their work. Such infrastructure needs will be determined by the Chief of Police and the DCOP-Adm., but they will likely include:

a. Operational Infrastructure Within the Old City

- 1) A main headquarters to be located in the Old City;
- 2) Substations located in each of the different neighbourhoods with temporary holding facilities in each;
- 3) A number of police posts located within the Old City from which detachments can be dispatched at short notice to deal with incidents. In conjunction with the use of electronic measures such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), this system will allow swift reaction to problems requiring police attention; and
- 4) Specialized pedestrian and vehicle installations at certain gates to control access to and exit from the Old City.

b. Operational Infrastructure Outside the Old City

- 1) A Police Service training and education centre;
- 2) Offices for the various branches of the Police Service;
- 3) A Quartermaster facility, including a magazine;
- 4) Facilities for the PORDU; and
- 5) Facilities for EOD and other specialist organizations.

c. Non-Operational Infrastructure Outside the Old City

- 1) Quarters for single officers;
- 2) Married quarters for Police Service officers and their families; and
- 3) Recreation facilities.

Administration and Logistics

40. *The DCOP-Adm* will be responsible for planning and implementing the administrative and logistic organizations needed to support the activities of the Police Service. In the possible structure proposed in Annex A is a suggested outline of these organizations. It will be for the DCOP-Adm to ensure they are manned with appropriately trained personnel from the beginning of operations. Procurement contracts should be let on the basis of open bidding with no fixed quotas. The Police Service should actively seek local vendors in conformity with procurement regulations issued by the Administrator. The Police Service personnel and training branches will each be responsible for the recruiting and training of the Police Service personnel and for providing the administrative services necessary for them and their families.

41. *Uniforms* An important issue is the subject of visual identity. It is vital that Police Service officers are easily identifiable to residents and visitors within the Old City, and it may also be considered important that each individual carries some identifying symbol of his or her country of origin. It will be up to the Chief of Police to make recommendations to the Administrator regarding this subject.

42. *Equipment, Arms and Facilitations* The Police Service will require free, uninhibited and unrestricted entry into its operational area of equipment, arms, and communications and other items needed to carry out its functions, exempt from all duties and taxes. The same should apply to personal mail, including packages for personal use, by Police Service members. No charges shall be levied by the Parties for any of the above.

43. *Communications* The Parties shall commit to assign radio frequencies to the Police Service in accordance with its requirements. The Police Service may also wish to install cable or low-power television transmitters for use in training and recreation. The Parties' execution of this commitment should be reviewed by the Governance Board, with input from the Administrator and the Police Service.

44. *Financing* There will be considerable costs in developing and implementing the operation of the Police Service. While financing is not a part of this study, we expect that such costs will be agreed to as part of a final status agreement between Israel and Palestine, and that the international community will fund the set-up of the Police Service and the Emergency Reserve Force.

Oversight

45. As mentioned earlier we believe that a Police Board should be established to oversee the operation of the Police Service and its members. We believe that the Administrator should

appoint a representative to be Chairman of the Board – which could be done on a rotational basis – and that the Board might include:

- a. Members from the Old City neighbourhoods;
- b. Representatives from each of the Abrahamic religions; and
- c. Representatives from each of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities.


46. To be effective, and to build public confidence in the operation of the Police Service, we believe that the Police Board should meet on a regular basis, with the Chief of Police called to attend and to respond to questions from members, and that the proceedings should be open to the public.

Conclusion

47. The concept of the Old City Special Regime and its security system depends on agreement being reached between Israel and Palestine to authorize its creation and to determine its functions and duration. The purpose of this assessment has been to outline what our experience and our knowledge up to this point leads us to believe are factors that could contribute to the successful operation of a security system in the Old City as part of the Regime.

48. From our reading of papers produced by our Israeli and Palestinian partners, and our discussions with each of them singly and together, and with many others, we are aware that there is not total agreement on a number of the issues, but that there is agreement on some. It is our belief that the points of difference are capable of resolution. We believe that an effective security system to address the special circumstances of the Old City is achievable.

OLD CITY POLICE SERVICE



Annex B to JOCI Security Assessment November 2007
**Options On Entry And Exit Control In The Old City
Proposed System For Jaffa Gate**

Introduction

1. We believe that one of the key aspects of security in the Old City will be the importance of controlling entry and exit to and from it. The ability to prevent undesirables (terrorists, criminals, etc) from entering the Old City, and the ability to arrest those who have committed crimes there, will call for security measures tailored to the special circumstances of the Old City and potential threats to it. Balanced against this requirement is the need to preserve an atmosphere of normality and to provide for the unhindered access and egress of the regular inhabitants and visitors. A further consideration is that in making whatever adjustments to existing infrastructure that may be considered necessary, care has to be taken not to interfere with the historic and aesthetic nature of the Old City's gates and thoroughfares.

2. To examine the challenge of providing security in the Old City during periods of low to high security threat-levels, we concentrate on examining the provision of appropriate security measures at the Jaffa Gate, given its key location as a major pedestrian and vehicle entry and exit point. While we focus in detail on the Jaffa Gate, we also look at general requirements for control over entry and exit across the whole of the Old City.

3. We endorse the need for a similar study to be conducted on a gate leading into what will be Al Quds and the State of Palestine. We have not attached the *Jaffa Gate Crossing Facilities Study* as an Annex to this paper given its length, but it should be referred to as an integral part of the work of the Security Working Group. The study is available on the Jerusalem Old City Initiative website: www.uwindsor.ca/jerusaleminitiative.

Aim

4. The aim of this annex is to cover some of the key points concerning the physical and architectural aspects of entry and exit into the Old City, with particular reference to the Jaffa Gate, and the conclusions we draw from them.

Outline

5. The discussion will address the following issues:
- a. Threat;
 - b. General Principles;
 - c. The Gates;
 - d. Entry and Exit Options;
 - e. Vehicle Policy; and
 - f. Architecture.

Threat

6. As we noted earlier, the Old City is a key focus for those who wish to disrupt Israeli-Palestinian co-existence as well as Jewish-Muslim interaction. Events within the Old City can attract interest from political and religious factions around the world and lead to attempts to incite violence or attack religious sites within the City. Religious or political-based terrorism is therefore a major potential threat. Similarly, the location of important religious sites within the City attracts large numbers of pilgrims at various times of the year. Massive crowding within the constrained area of the City, coupled with the limited pedestrian and vehicle routes inside the walls, pose particular problems for crowd control and the danger of injury caused by panic.

7. These threats to safety and security must be met by the ability, when necessary, to impose an escalating range of control measures over those entering or leaving the city. Planning must allow for the worst case scenario, and measures and infrastructure must be put in place to counter it. Other measures must be planned to cater to diminishing threat levels, so that in a steady state, the minimum disruption to pedestrian and vehicle traffic is imposed. While the ideal would be to have a minimum threat level posture as the steady state (Condition Green, say), there must be an ability to move rapidly into the most severe threat mode (such as Condition Red). It is taken as a given that since the Regime will be in place at the agreement of the Parties, both will do all they can to assist the Police Service in foiling any attempt to pose a threat to, or disrupt the running of, the Old City.

General Principles

8. Since entry to and exit from the Old City involves the two Parties as well as the Regime, we have examined the subject based on four general principles:

- a. Entry and exit points into and from the Old City should be staffed by the Police Service with the presence of the authorities of the state involved;
- b. In order to facilitate movement into the Old City, each Party should take such measures at the entry point in its territory as to ensure the preservation of security in the Old City. The Police Service will monitor the operation of the entry and exit points;
- c. Citizens of either Party and tourists may exit the Old City only into the territory of the Party for which they possess valid authorization to enter; and
- d. Residents of the Old City, or special permit holders, will be able to enter with special checking regulations. A special procedure for such individuals will be defined by the Administrator, based on advice from the Parties, in an independent protocol.

The Gates

9. Of the eight gates in the Old City, seven are open and are used to enter and exit. Five of the gates (Dung Gate, Zion Gate, Jaffa Gate, New Gate and Lion's Gate) have some access to vehicles and all, including the pedestrian-only Damascus Gate and Herod's Gate, are widely used year-round.

10. Of note is the existence of the ring road around the Old City – which leads into the five gates that have vehicle-access – and the area between the road and the walls. A suggestion has been made that this area be regarded as a “buffer zone” in which the Regime shares responsibility with the authorities of the appropriate Party. While we do not fully agree with this suggestion, we do agree that in certain cases, where the architecture of the security apparatus controlling exit and entry into the Old City calls for it, the Police Service should have the ability to operate there in the execution of its access-control mandate and given the need to inspect the exterior walls. The infrastructure we propose for the Jaffa Gate extends beyond the walls and Police Service officers will be required to work there.

Entry and Exit Options

11. We have looked at various levels of providing security at the gates and considered a number of options as to how that may be achieved depending on the status of the threat at the time. One option is the procedure used at many airport terminals, with passengers presenting their passport - or pass -upon entering or leaving the country. This latter system provides as little restriction as possible to local citizens and visitors alike, and is the most likely to facilitate tourism and pilgrimage into the Old City.

12. Under whichever system is finally accepted, special arrangements will have to be in place to treat full-time residents of the Old City with appropriate consideration. Also, if the system is to work smoothly and to best advantage, there will need to be particular emphasis on co-operation between the Police Service and agencies of the two Parties in their exercise of control at the gates. It seems to us that ultimately the Administrator will have to decide what documentation will be required that will provide the least impediment to ease of movement

but at the same time assure the necessary level of security. As mentioned above, the study we commissioned considers a variety of options and we believe it should be up to the Administrator, in concert with the Parties, and based on advice from the Chief of Police, to decide how they wish to address this issue.

Vehicle Policy

13. Some suggestions have been made that all vehicles should be excluded from entering the Old City. Other suggestions are that only official Regime and Police Service vehicles (including emergency vehicles) should be allowed access. We believe that none of these suggestions is advisable. As we have mentioned elsewhere, we consider it important that a state of normality be encouraged in the Old City under the Regime and excluding or placing restrictions on a majority of vehicles – other than in a situation of heightened security – would not support that end. That said, we see the need for putting in place some measures to control the vehicles that are permitted to enter (e.g., emergency vehicles, commercial vehicles, Regime and Police Service vehicles, and some private vehicles).

14. Under present arrangements, vehicles entering the Jaffa Gate must exit through the Zion Gate or the Dung Gate. While there is space available to locate security control installations for vehicles entering the Jaffa Gate, there is no such space available for similar installations to check vehicles exiting at the Dung Gate. A compromise, whereby public transport vehicles only will enter and exit by the Dung Gate, traveling as far as the roundabout, while some public transport will also use the Jaffa Gate for both entrance and exit, might be considered. Private vehicles could enter by the Jaffa Gate and exit by the Zion Gate and emergency vehicles could both enter and exit by the Jaffa Gate (see Appendix 1). In both cases the infrastructure at the three gates mentioned will have to allow for the checking of both vehicles and passengers or pedestrians.

Architecture

15. In proposing the necessary infrastructure for security control at the Jaffa Gate, we have underlined the importance of installations that provide the required capability to check the various categories of vehicle traffic entering or exiting there (e.g., private, commercial and emergency), as well as the various categories of pedestrians or passengers (e.g., inhabitants, visitors, business personnel, worshippers, pilgrims, tourists, etc). At the same time we have emphasized the importance of avoiding structures that might mar the appearance of the Gate itself and the surrounding walls, and we have noted that special efforts should be made to preserve those parts of the area that have archaeological significance.

16. Proposed vehicle security control arrangements for the Jaffa Gate are shown at Appendix 2, which also demonstrates why the controlling infrastructure must be located outside the wall. It is for this reason that we recommend the Police Service be given authority to operate outside the walls in such control situations.

Conclusion

17. We have examined the various challenges in providing security-control measures for those entering and exiting the Old City and considered options for meeting those challenges. We

believe there are a number of workable ways in which measures can be put in place to provide security control at the gates to cover a spectrum of threats, each of which will have to be agreed between the Parties and the Administrator to make the system work. Amongst the solutions we consider workable are several that have been proposed by the Study we commissioned on this issue. We suggest that this Study's recommendations be examined as a means whereby the Administrator and the Parties can put in place effective entry and exit mechanisms at the Jaffa Gate and at other gates.


Old City Special Regime

D. The special regime and the gates

2. The OC border regime: The vehicle policy

Although this study recommends applying strict restrictions on vehicle entering and exiting the Old City, there still remains a need for a coherent vehicle security policy regarding security maintenance of permitted vehicles within the Old City. The illustration describes the current vehicle movement system between Jaffa Gate and Dung Gate. Both gates have a two-way entrance to a roundabout. From that point the roads narrow dramatically and become a one-way roads. Nowadays, traffic enters the Old City through Jaffa Gate and exits either through the narrow Zion Gate or through Dung Gate.


There are a few options for future organizing traffic movement within the Old City. These options largely depend upon the security procedure for entering or exiting vehicles. The study therefore focuses on identifying a proper space near the gate. In the current traffic scheme there is a possibility for inspecting vehicles once they enter through Jaffa Gate, but no vacant space for such a facility in the Dung Gate exit.



Jaffa Gate Study

C. Jaffa Gate vehicle entrance

This illustration describes the facility's general layout. Entrance (scarlet arrow) will be available to all permitted vehicles. The exit, however, will be restricted to OCSP (Old City Social Police) and public transportation only (orange arrow). The permitted vehicles exit will take place at Zion Gate or Dung Gate, depending on the final transportation scheme.



Index

- Entering Vehicles
- Authorized Vehicles

Introduction

1. The Learning, Training and Development (LTD) strategy for members of the Old City Police Service is to produce officers capable of providing an effective police service that meets the special requirements of Jerusalem's Old City. Principal factors among the special requirements are dealing with the different backgrounds and sensitivities of residents, protecting the sanctity and availability of the holy sites, and controlling and assisting the varying numbers of tourists, worshippers and pilgrims who visit the Old City on a regular basis. While the protection and recognition of the human rights of all who live in or visit the Old City is a major part of the Police Service's function, the primary role will be enforcing law and order in the Old City.

2. It will be up to the Old City Chief of Police and his training experts to define the LTD strategy needed to produce a police service equal to the requirements. We believe that the Police Service should comprise officers of exemplary integrity who can enjoy broad public support and whose discretion and skills in negotiation, reasoning and mediation are sufficient to ensure an environment in which public safety and respect for human rights are maintained. The LTD strategy adopted by the Police Service should be designed accordingly.

Aim

3. The aim of this annex is to outline the factors we believe the Chief of Police and his staff should consider when developing the training program for Police Service members.

Outline

4. This annex is organized as follows:
- a. A general assessment of the requirements;
 - b. The goals and needs of policing in the Old City;
 - c. Core themes of policing;
 - d. Guiding principles of effective and accountable policing;
 - e. Community policing;
 - f. Core competencies;
 - g. Organizational structure;
 - h. Training functions including:
 - 1) Familiarization training;
 - 2) Basic training;
 - 3) Field training;
 - 4) Management and executive training;
 - 5) Outside agency training;
 - 6) Diversity and language training.
 - i. Evaluation

General Assessment of the Requirements

5. In any context there are complexities associated with policing. These are even more apparent in setting up a policing organization in the circumstances envisaged for Jerusalem's Old City Special Regime, where the pace of change is increasing, restructuring is constant, established practices are being subjected to critical analysis, and new technology and equipment are being introduced. Moreover the volume of legislation is at times overwhelming, while front-line operational performance is subject to constant scrutiny. The LTD process will require careful planning, effective policy development, structured implementation plans and adequate resources if positive benefits are to be fully realized.

Goals and Needs

6. A comprehensive and coherent LTD strategy, linked directly to the goals and needs of policing the Old City, will:

- a. Cultivate community policing and partnership policing;
- b. Demonstrate that stakeholders are getting the best value possible for their investment in police service training;
- c. Inculcate continuous learning and knowledge-development as the basis for maintaining a dynamic learning organization;
- d. Imbed throughout the learning organization the appropriate values, attitudes and behaviours;
- e. Ensure a continuous improvement in the quality and performance of Police Service members and training staff;
- f. Demonstrate and imbue the organizational cohesion necessary for a successful police service.

Core Themes

7. The LTD process will promote core themes throughout its curriculum that emphasize the importance of:

- a. Human rights theory and practice;
- b. Community policing;
- c. Community safety;
- d. Diversity and professional practice;
- e. Problem-solving policing;
- f. Professional standards and ethics;
- g. Health and safety; and
- h. Best practice, best value.

Guiding Principles

8. The pursuit of the core themes in LTD will greatly assist in meeting the guiding principles that ensure Police Service officers function professionally and accountably:

- a. In a way that actively promotes and protects human rights in accordance with all relevant internationally recognized rules and practices, by ensuring that respect for human rights is emphasized in training curricula and is imbedded in all courses given by the Police Service;

- b. With integrity, impartiality, courtesy, compassion and courage, through the alignment of LTD under one philosophy delivered in support of core competencies;
- c. Treating everyone fairly, regardless of ethnic origin, political or religious belief, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age or social background, with the LTD strategy designed to reflect the organization's vision and aspirations for the future;
- d. Efficiently and effectively through partnership and in concert with the two governments and the Jerusalem Old City Administration, with the LTD strategy shaped by the vision of community policing that implies internal and external partnerships and problem-solving at the front line of policing;
- e. In a way that is adaptable and – through consultation – reflects local priorities acceptable to local communities and partners, with LTD emphasizing the processes of “how to learn” and “problem-solve” to the benefit of the communities that the police serve;
- f. In dealing speedily and transparently with police wrongdoing in cooperation with the Police Board, with the concept imbedded in the LTD curriculum that there are consequences to all police actions; and
- g. Respecting and safeguarding the right to life and the protection of property with an LTD strategy based on life-like situations and the reality of the circumstances in the Old City and the Region.

Community Policing

9. One of the fundamental principles of community policing is to gain the trust of community members and to engage them in helping to develop a situation in which law and order prevails, with the community assisting in keeping it that way. Foremost is the need to assure the community that the police will be firm in the enforcement of the law, and will do so in a fair and impartial manner. The community also needs to be convinced that the recognition of human rights will be respected and applied equally to all members.

10. It follows, therefore, that in addition to training members of the Police Service in the basic elements of law enforcement, training in human rights standards must be fully integrated into the LTD process at all levels: in cadet training at the Police College, in field training, and during other in-service training courses and exercises. The respect of human rights must be included in training in the use of force and the use of firearms, as well as in exercises that demonstrate its application in life-like situations peculiar to the Old City. Special training in this area will be necessary for members of the Public Order Rapid Deployment Unit (PORDU), whose deployment will normally be in response to incidents where the usual methods of law enforcement have been insufficient to meet the need.

Core Competences

11. The training program for the Police Service will provide the cornerstone for building an effective relationship between the police and the Old City community (and in this sense the “community” comprises the visitors and pilgrims as well as the residents). To be effective in building the confidence necessary for effective community policing, certain core competencies should be included in the training program.

These include:

- a. Integrity;

- b. Leadership;
- c. Client-orientation and service-delivery, including cultural sensitivity;
- d. Action-management;
- e. Thinking skills;
- f. Continuous knowledge enhancement.

Organizational Structure

12. To deliver the LTD strategy that we are proposing requires a broad organizational structure, based on modern international police services that can be amended to suit the circumstances, a structure that we believe can meet the training requirements of the Police Service. In view of the complexity associated with developing the infrastructure for the delivery of the LTD strategy, we are recommending that a suitably qualified International Technical Advisor be co-located at the senior level of the Police Service training structure. His or her function would be to serve as a senior advisor to the Head of Learning, Training and Development and provide the expertise to meet commitments. See the organizational chart included in Appendix 1 to this annex. In Appendix 2 are details of some of the terms used in the chart and an explanation of the roles and responsibilities envisaged for the Police Service training structure.

Training Functions

13. We believe the training model should have curricula and course standards based on the core competencies. The model should involve a problem-oriented approach that includes theory, as well as situational exercises stressing the importance of problem identification based on the complex Jerusalem Old City reality. Exercises that emphasize team problem-solving, negotiation, mediation, consensus building, and role-playing activities should be included. The Police Service should adopt a model used by a number of major police services worldwide. In this so-called SARA Model, problem solving incorporates a sequential Scanning, Assessing/Analysing, Response, and Assessment approach (SARA). We believe that such training can go a long way to provide the candidates with required core skills as well as an understanding of the fundamental concepts of policing within the community.

14. As in any large organization, training must be designed to reflect the organization's vision and purpose. In this case, it must also take into account that Police Service members will initially be taking over responsibility for policing in the Old City from the Israeli Security Forces, at the same time as developing untrained international recruits to serve as full-time officers. As mentioned in the main paper, this process will involve the initial deployment of a cadre of trained professional international police officers who assume responsibility for policing in the Old City until the main element is trained and ready to deploy. This cadre, though consisting of trained professionals, will still require a familiarization course to inform its members of the special circumstances of the Old City as well as the structure and procedures of the organization in which they will serve.

15. To meet this one-time requirement it will be necessary to have the initial cadre undergo familiarization training at the same time as the basic course starts for the newly recruited international candidates and the Israeli and Palestinian CLOs. Thus the training structure will be required to cater temporarily to an unusually large number of personnel, but only for as long as the familiarization course is run. Once the initial cadre has finished its familiarization training and deployed to its role in the Old City, the training structure can be adjusted to the level required by a steady-state recruit training intake.

16. We believe that an Old City Police Service Police College should be the organization that delivers the main elements of the LTD program. We recommend it be located outside the Old

City, since space for lecture-rooms, student accommodation, logistical needs and training area requirements will not be available within the Old City's perimeter. The College's sole role will be to train Police Service personnel; its staff and students will have no police powers outside the Old City's walls. We also see an advantage to locating the PORDU with the school, both to share accommodation and, if appropriate, to assist in the training role. The steady-state student capacity of the Police College will depend on the approved strength of the Police Service -a responsibility of the Administrator, based on recommendations from the Chief of Police - but we envisage it to be in the region of 300 to 350 students at a time.

17. The types of courses or programs we suggest will be needed to meet the Police Service's requirements are as follows:

- a. ***Familiarization Training Course*** This should be designed to introduce trained international police officers to the special circumstances of the Old City as well as to inform them of the Chief of Police's Standard Operating Procedures. We believe the course should last about two months. While it will be given by the Police College Training Staff, it would benefit from the involvement of some Israeli and Palestinian instructors. The aim will be to prepare the international cadre to take over responsibility for policing in the Old City from the Israeli security elements;
- b. ***Basic Training Program*** This should be approximately six months long, providing candidates with the introductory training necessary to reach the level of basically-trained police officers, while incorporating the topics covered in the Familiarization Course. The aim is to prepare candidates to carry out policing duties under supervision in the Old City;
- c. ***Field Training Program (Field Coach Program)*** We believe that Police Service field commanders should be responsible for conducting this program, including its delivery, monitoring, assessment and evaluation. During the first six month period in which newly trained officers are deployed in the Old City, they will be supervised by trained superiors as they put into practice the knowledge and skills learned in the classroom;
- d. ***Management and Executive Training Program*** This program should focus on core competencies and knowledge of the environment, public policy trends and skills related to leadership. It should promote unity of purpose and a working environment committed to service, teamwork, innovation and creativity, professionalism, and accountability. While senior management courses will be given at various levels of command or authority, we believe they should each address the issues of:
 - 1) Leadership;
 - 2) Managing human resources;
 - 3) Managing fiscal resources;
 - 4) Managing information and technology; and
 - 5) Managing the External Environment, e.g., neighbourhood relations, community policing, and public order restorative policing.
- e. ***Outside Agency Training*** Even though we envisage that most of the training of Police Service personnel will be given in-house, it will be necessary to send some officers for specialist training that is either not available within the Police Service's resources or not cost-effective to develop there. This training might be available using Israeli or Palestinian resources or in other countries that support the Regime's work. The LTD program should take account of such requirements. Indeed, it should be arranged that

each officer spend some time in both Israel and Palestine (i.e. outside of Jerusalem) to become fully acquainted with the culture of each nationality as well as to become familiar with each nation's security and intelligence agencies.

- f. ***Diversity and Language Training*** A central LTD objective should be to educate Police Service personnel in working with and providing police services to people of diverse national, religious and social backgrounds. All Police Service officers must learn to understand the differing relationships that exist within the Old City as well as the differing community needs. This requires a course curriculum informing officers of these challenges and equipping them to meet them effectively. While each officer cannot be expected to be fluent in the different languages that are used within the Old City, a good understanding of English and some understanding of key phrases in both Arabic and Hebrew is important to develop good relations as well as to communicate. Time should be set aside in courses at all levels for some language training.


Evaluation

18. Evaluation of the effectiveness of training within the Police Service should be carried out regularly by Police Service staff, with the Chief of Police establishing measures to achieve this aim. These performance measures should seek to define not only quantitative but qualitative indicators. It is important to have in place qualitative measures related to effectiveness of the LTD programs and how the training is transmitted to the community by front line policing. We believe that other measures such as the conduct of public attitude and opinion surveys, as well as occasional validation visits from outside police services invited by the Chief of Police for that purpose, could be helpful in evaluating the success of the Old City Police Service training program, and suggesting improvements where appropriate.

Conclusion

19. The introduction of the Jerusalem Old City Police Service will constitute a new beginning for the more than thirty-five thousand residents of the Old City. In our assessment of the requirements for a security system to provide effective policing in the Old City we have gone to some lengths to demonstrate our belief in the importance of portraying the Police Service as a "Service" rather than as a "Force". We believe it is important that the Police Service officers be viewed by the Old City's residents and visitors as trained professionals whose role is to maintain law and order and to provide them with assistance and advice when needed. We believe that success will follow once the Police Service is viewed as having the ability to investigate, detect and prevent crime, protect property and persons and arrest and hold in custody perpetrators of crime. While the principal role of Police Service members must always be to enforce the law within the Old City, we believe this training program will help ensure they do so in a manner that will win and then keep the confidence and respect of the people there.

LEARNING, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT



Learning, Training and Development Organizational Structure

1. The intention of this proposal is to suggest a broad organizational training infrastructure for the Police Service. It is a proposal that can be altered or amended for effectiveness or for efficiency reasons.

Authority

2. All LTD programs will be the responsibility of the Head of LTD who will report to the Deputy Chief-Administration and Support (DCOP-Adm), who will chair a Training Policy Group that will incorporate organizational needs and, more importantly, the Police Service's operational side.

Architecture/Methodology

3. The proposed LTD strategy is designed to meet the needs of the Police Service through a systematic and consistent approach to LTD services organizationally and strategically as well as at an individual and team level. To make optimal use of training time, technology and alternative means of delivery should be employed, including classroom-based training, distance learning packages, internet and intranet focus on interactive computer-based training, video presentations, pre-read materials, on-the-job training, problem-based scenario training, and partnership development training with other police services and emergency services as well as other criminal justice and social agencies in the community. Most importantly, the LTD should be focused on workplace problems related to the Old City's unique environment.

4. To ensure a firm link between Police Service's goals and the LTD's capacity to meet those goals, a continuous evaluation process should focus on future needs, while performance indicators are developed to measure the relationship between training and Police Service performance.

5. The organizational chart in Appendix 1 reflects a structure we believe capable of delivering an effective LTD strategy. Based on modern international police service structures, it is flexible enough to be amended to suit the special circumstances of the Police Service. A number of positions central to this structure are explained in the following sub-paragraphs:

- a. **Head of Learning, Training and Development** This position will report to the DCOP-Adm. and will be responsible for Police Service organizational LTD policy development. This area of responsibility will need the right people with expertise in LTD to develop timely and standardized training policy.
- b. **Head of Learning, Training and Development (Police College)** It is our contention that the Head of LTD will also serve in this position, thereby assuming responsibility for the operations of the Police College. This allows for one policy centre and eliminates redundancy. The College will be responsible for basic foundation training, in-service training and specialized training programs.
- c. **Branches** There will be three branches reporting directly to the Head of the Police College including:
 - 1) Learning support;
 - 2) Strategic development; and
 - 3) Operational programs.
 - 4)

- d. **Head of Learning Support** This position will be responsible for the following support areas:
- 1) Human resources (College Registry) and finance (Budget Comptrollership);
 - 2) Occupational psychology;
 - 3) Human rights and diversity;
 - 4) Culture and language training;
 - 5) External training (outreach programs to other institutions); and
 - 6) E-learning programs.
- e. **Head of Strategic Development** This position will be responsible for LTD organizational policy incorporating ‘best value training’ with ‘best practice training’ to meet the Police Service’s institutional and operational requirements. There are four major components under strategic development, including:
- 1) Planning;
 - 2) Evaluation, performance, measurement and quality assurance;
 - 3) Training needs, assessment and development policy; and
 - 4) LTD strategy.
- f. **Head of Operational Programs** This position will be responsible for combined operational training, including areas such as firearms training, first aid training, public order policing, tactical training, close protection unit and driver training. He will also be responsible for:
- 1) Familiarization training;
 - 2) Basic training;
 - 3) Leadership development;
 - 4) Simulated learning (Information and communication technology training); and
 - 5) Specialist operation branch training (evidence and disclosure training, photography, and surveillance techniques etc.).

Future Considerations

6. The Old City Police Service Police College, in addition to being the institution that provides the development and training programs required by Police Service members might conceivably be developed at some stage to become a Law Enforcement Training Centre providing courses for non-Police Service members of the Old City Special Regime. Consideration might eventually be given to inviting representatives of other nations with an interest in the Israeli-and Palestinian-supported Old City special initiative, to attend lectures and seminars at the College. The latter might constitute a practical approach to convince other nations to support and provide resources for this initiative.

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