Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation & Rhetoric along with the PhD in Argumentation Studies at the University of Windsor invite you to a talk by
“Can Rational Persuasion Be Epistemically Paternalistic?”
This paper addresses two related questions about belief, inquiry, and persuasion. The first is a question about the nature of epistemic paternalism, which is, roughly, the activity of interfering in other people’s inquiry, for their own epistemic benefit. I want to provide a characterization of epistemic paternalism that is a bit different from how it is usually characterized in the literature. The second question is about rational persuasion, and whether it can ever be paternalistic, or (better) whether it can be disrespectful and prima facie wrong in the same way that at least some cases of paternalism are disrespectful and prima facie wrong. Tsai (2014) has argued persuasively that rational persuasion can in fact be paternalistic. I argue here that, while Tsai is on to something important about the paternalistic use of reasons, his central example of a paternalistic use of reasons to persuade someone in fact falls short of the ideal of rational persuasion.
Friday, April 8, 2022
Weekly presentations conducted via Zoom as well as in-person meeting in CHS 53.
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