Speaker Series 2024 January 19th

Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation & Rhetoric along with the PhD in Argumentation Studies at the University of Windsor invite you to a talk by

Dr. Phyllis Rooney, Department of Philosophy, Oakland University

(In recognition of Dr. Catherine Hundleby) Argumentation and Social Justice: Arguing for Truth and Justice

ABSTRACT: In 2010 Dr. Catherine Hundleby and I had the special opportunity to co-edit a volume, Reasoning for Change (a special issue of Informal Logic, vol. 30, no. 3).  We set out to draw connections between work in argumentation theory and developments in feminist philosophy, with the goal of advancing understandings of what it means to reason and argue well when that is a necessary step in helping to bring about progressive social and political change.  In the first part of my talk, I will examine important developments that resulted from that volume (and related work).  This will include an accounting of recent work on the following (connected) questions: In what way is adversarial argumentation a feminist and/or social justice issue?  What is the relationship between practices of argumentation and the content of arguments?  How does feminist work on the epistemological significance of social identity inform new work in argumentation theory?  What is the significance of non-ideal theorizing (as developed in recent work in feminist and critical race philosophy) for theorizing about argumentation?  (I will include special mention of Dr. Hundleby’s recent work on these topics.)

In the second part of my talk, I will draw together insights from this recent work into my ongoing examinations of feminist critiques of traditional understandings of reason and rationality and what those critiques authorize: new thinking about what it means to reason well when (greater) truth and justice are our goals.  These goals are connected, as revealed especially in non-ideal theorizing that starts from particular entanglements of injustice and untruth.  Relatively new concepts such as white ignorance (C. Mills) and epistemic injustice (M. Fricker) illustrate such entanglements.  All of this provides productive ground for thinking anew about what it means to argue for truth and justice.


Friday, January 19, 2024

3:00 pm

Chrysler Hall North, 1163